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ABSTRACT 
Garcetti v. Ceballos was intended to clear up an area of First Amendment law so murky that it was the 
source not only of circuit splits but also of intra-circuit splits—panels from within the same circuit had 
arrived at opposite results in nearly identical cases. As it turned out, the Supreme Court itself was as 
splintered as the circuits. Of all the previously argued cases that remained undecided during the Court’s 
transition involving Justice O’Connor’s retirement and Justice Alito’s confirmation, Garcetti was the only 
one for which the Court ordered a second argument. This suggested to some that without a ninth vote the 
Court was deadlocked or even split three ways. After reargument, the Court held, in a 5-4 opinion with two 
dissents, that speech made “pursuant to an employee’s official duties” is not citizen speech for First 
Amendment purposes. 
Garcetti was a long-overdue effort to address a decades-old ambiguity in the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence. In 1968, the Court had established the Pickering balancing test to weigh the competing 
interests of government employer and government employee in First Amendment retaliation claims. Then 
in Connick, it created a threshold question for such claims: only speech made “as a citizen on matters of 
public concern” could proceed to analysis under Pickering. One issue had remained unclear after Connick:
Is there ever a time when an employee speaks “as a citizen on matters of public concern” in the course of 
doing her job?  
 That is exactly what Richard Ceballos said he was doing when he wrote an internal memo to his 
superiors in the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office critical of a questionable affidavit used to obtain a 
search warrant; he claimed they later retaliated against him. The Supreme Court found that because the 
memo was prepared as part of Ceballos’s duties, it was not citizen speech and thus was not protected.  
This Article analyzes how published district and appellate court decisions issued in the months 
immediately following Garcetti illustrate that certain First Amendment retaliation claims are now 
foreclosed. What is perhaps surprising, however, is the type and number of claims that are surviving 
Garcetti. Circuits had often referred to the approach chosen by the Court as a per se rule, but Garcetti is a 
per se rule with an Achilles’ heel—a refusal to say how “official duties” are to be defined—that gives 
plaintiffs unexpected leverage to resist dismissal and summary judgment.  
This Article analyzes how courts have interpreted the “pursuant to the employee’s official duties” 
requirement and on what grounds Garcetti has been distinguished. It offers examples that call into question 
the assertion that First Amendment protection is inappropriate and unnecessary because other protections 
are available. Having concluded that current whistleblower statutes have significant gaps and that going 
public with negative information would likely only mean the employee who suffers retaliation wins the 
battle (the Connick/Garcetti test) and loses the war (the Pickering balancing test), the Article ends by 
arguing for the approach found in the Garcetti minority opinion advocating an “adjustment” of Pickering 
that would take into account the public’s interest in protection of the speech in question regardless of the 
capacity in which the speaker made the statements.
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Tough Talk from the Supreme Court on Free Speech: 
The Illusory Per Se Rule in Garcetti As Further Evidence of Connick’s 
Unworkable Employee/Citizen Speech Partition 
 
Sonya Bice 
“Everything is vague to a degree you do not realize till you have tried to make it precise . . . . 
When you pass from the vague to the precise . . . you always run a certain risk of error.” 
- Bertrand Russell1
INTRODUCTION 
The line the Supreme Court drew in Connick v. Myers2 between speech made 
“as a citizen upon matters of public concern” (constitutionally protected when it 
outweighs employer interests) and speech made “as an employee upon matters 
only of personal interest” (not) has proved tricky to apply. That has been 
especially true in cases of so-called “whistleblowers”—those who “seek to bring 
to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust.”3 One of the big 
questions Connick left unanswered4 was whether an employee’s job-related 
speech (as opposed to speech on a public issue unrelated to her job) ever qualifies 
as “speech made as a citizen on matters of public concern”—the threshold 
inquiry—and thereby proceeds to the balancing test devised in Pickering v. 
Board of Education.5 Prior to Garcetti v. Ceballos,6 federal courts applying 
 
1 BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOGICAL ATOMISM 38 (Open Court Publishing 
Company, 1985) (1918). 
2 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144 (1983). 
3 Id. 
4 At least partly unanswered. Connick cannot properly be reconciled with an absolute per se rule 
eliminating protection of speech made at work to other coworkers about the terms of working 
conditions because the Court did undertake a balancing test for one of the statements in question—
a statement made at work to other co-workers about alleged pressures to work on political 
campaigns. (“Because one of the questions in Myers’s survey touched upon a matter of public 
concern . . . we must determine whether Connick was justified in discharging Myers.” Id. at 149.)  
An interesting question is thus raised as to whether Garcetti would block Myers from reaching the 
balancing test that she reached under the Connick test. If so, does the recent ruling overrule rather 
than clarify the precedent? If not, it follows that Garcetti should be read narrowly. 
5 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 567 (1968). 
6 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006). 
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Connick had given different answers to this question.7 The Fourth and Fifth 
Circuits said it does not; the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits said it does; and in four 
other circuits, panels within a circuit had reached opposite conclusions in 
apparently indistinguishable cases.8
When the Supreme Court took up the question in Garcetti, a 5-4 majority 
held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official 
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
purposes,”9 and thus lose constitutional protection for that speech.  
A New York City cop who had been given responsibility for safety issues in 
the precinct alerted officials to employees’ chronic health problems and the 
potential link to leaking gasoline storage tanks. Almost immediately after he 
revealed the embarrassing problem, he was stripped of duties, reassigned 
multiple times and disciplined for minor infractions. His First Amendment 
retaliation claim, which had survived summary judgment motions under the 
Pickering/Connick test and had been in litigation for three years, was one of 
Garcetti’s first casualties.10 The district court found that his case fell squarely 
within the type of First Amendment claim categorically excluded from protection 
under Garcetti’s added rule—that whistleblower claims cannot be brought by 
employees for whom reporting problems was part of the job.11 
7 Legal scholars have criticized the Connick framework as turning on an unnecessarily arbitrary 
distinction between “employee speech” and “citizen speech.” See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel, 
Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007 (2005) (calling current free 
speech doctrine “fundamentally flawed” and advocating full protection for “external” speech and 
no protection for “internal” speech with four specific exceptions); Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible 
Content Discrimination Under the First Amendment: The Strange Case of the Public Employee, 25 
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 529 (1998) (arguing that a better test would require an employer to show 
“an interest unrelated to suppressing an employee’s beliefs about management” modeled on United 
States v. O’Brien); Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on 
Matters of Public Concern, 64 Ind. L. J. 43 (1988) (advocating a “return to Pickering” without the 
narrowing effects of Connick, and allowing any speech that addresses a matter of public concern to 
be subject to the balancing test); and Toni Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the 
Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 68 (1987) (advocating protection of all speech, on 
both private and public matters, unless “any government interests exist that might justify restriction 
of the speech”).  
8 See infra pp. 6-8. 
9 Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1960. 
10 Ruotolo v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 5045(SHS), 2006 WL 2033662 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 
2006). 
11 Id. at *3. 
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Outside of that relatively limited subset are employees who face retaliation 
for speaking out about job-related problems when it is not so explicitly their jobs 
to do so, such as Keith Hill, a borough manager who claimed constructive 
termination after he opposed some of the policies and projects of the mayor.12 In 
considering cases in this second group of First Amendment retaliation claims in 
just the first few months following Garcetti, lower courts have already diverged 
on interpreting the Supreme Court’s “pursuant to official duties” requirement. 
Courts that take to heart the Supreme Court’s words about “a proper inquiry” into 
whether a task is “within the scope of the employee’s professional duties for First 
Amendment purposes”13 have made clear with surprising swiftness: Garcetti will 
not turn out to be quite the per se rule it was hailed (and decried) to be. 
Based on an analysis of published opinions handed down in the months 
immediately following Garcetti, this Article contends that despite the apparently 
categorical nature of the holding, its “per se” standard has proved to be 
unexpectedly elastic in application. The Court’s implied directive to lower courts 
to conduct a “proper inquiry” into whether the speech in question is part of the 
duties the employee “actually is expected to perform” opens the door for lower 
courts to evade Garcetti or at least mitigate its potential harshness.  
Part I starts with a brief explanation of the development of the jurisprudence 
on public employees’ First Amendment rights. It goes on to describe the circuit 
and intra-circuit splits that led to Garcetti and to discuss the rationale of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling as well as the three dissents. Part II analyzes how the 
district and appellate courts that handed down opinions immediately following 
Garcetti interpreted the “pursuant to the employee’s official duties” requirement 
and on what grounds Garcetti was distinguished. Assuming Garcetti now 
forecloses First Amendment protection for certain public employee speech, Part 
III discusses the viability of statutory protection for government employees who 
face retaliation for exposing misconduct and whether their “safest avenue of 
expression”14 is to forego internal reporting procedures and take the information 
public. Having concluded that current whistleblower statutes have significant 
gaps and that the option of going public with negative information would likely 
only mean that the employee wins the battle (the Connick/Garcetti test) and loses 
the war (the Pickering test), the Article ends by arguing that a better approach to 
 
12 Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, No. 05-1356, 2006 WL 2061145 (3d Cir. July 26, 2006). 
13 Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1962. 
14 The words are from the majority opinion: “Giving employees an internal forum for their speech 
will discourage them from concluding that the safest avenue of expression is to state their views in 
public.” Id. at 1961.  
BICE, TOUGH TALK 4
determining what speech is protected and what is not is found in the Garcetti 
minority’s advocacy of Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District15 (a 
unanimous decision written by then-Justice Rehnquist)16 as the controlling 
precedent and of an “adjustment” of Pickering that would take into account the 
public’s interest in protection of the speech in question regardless of the capacity 
in which the speaker made the statements. 
I.  Public Employees’ First Amendment Rights, from McAuliffe to Garcetti 
A. Protected Speech for Public Employees: The Road from “Never” to 
“Sometimes” 
When a Massachusetts constable was fired in 1892 for breaking a department 
rule that prohibited political activity, he failed to persuade the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court that there was anything constitutionally objectionable about the 
rule.17 In a two-page decision dismissing the case, Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., a state jurist not yet appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, stated as a 
self-evident fact that “there is nothing in the constitution or the statute to prevent 
the city from attaching obedience to this rule as a condition to the office of 
policeman,”18 and he added a statement that would not be successfully 
challenged for decades: “The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk 
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”19 
Like many well-crafted sound bites, Holmes’s statement had the ring of truth 
and the benefit of being memorable while disguising logical fallacies and failing 
to address certain inconvenient facts—which included, in this instance, the fact 
that the employer was the government.  This leave-your-rights-at-the-door 
approach generally prevailed at the U.S. Supreme Court from 1882 to 1952,20 
perhaps not coincidentally, since Holmes’s tenure on the Court spanned most of 
that period.21 
15 Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979). 
16 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1963 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
17 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (1892) (Mass.). 
18 Id.
19 Id. 
20 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144 (1983) (“For many years, Holmes’ epigram expressed this 
Court’s law”). 
21 Holmes himself authored at least one of the Court’s public employee free speech rulings that was 
consistent with McAuliffe: U.S. v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930). Holmes’s tenure on the 
Supreme Court lasted from 1902 to 1932. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES:
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When Marvin Pickering, a public school teacher who had been fired over a 
letter he wrote and sent to a newspaper on the issue of a local bond referendum, 
appealed a state high court decision that essentially tracked Holmes’s reasoning 
from 75 years earlier, 22 the Court reversed, saying,  
To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court’s 
opinion may be read to suggest that teachers 
may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish 
the First Amendment rights they would 
otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on 
matters of public interest in connection with the 
operation of the public schools in which they 
work, it proceeds on a premise that has been 
unequivocally rejected in numerous prior 
decisions of this Court.23 
The Court was referring to a string of cases in which it had struck down 
loyalty oaths and various mechanisms designed to deny employment to anyone 
who would not disclose and renounce Communist and “anti-government” 
associations.24 These cases culminated in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,25 which 
overturned a law requiring state university faculty members to sign, among other 
things, anti-Communist Party statements. It was Keyishian the Pickering Court 
quoted when it said, “[t]he theory that public employment which may be denied 
altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, 
has been uniformly rejected.”26 
The Court then fashioned a balancing test, in place nearly four decades later, 
that requires an employee to show that the speech in question was made as a 
citizen on matters of public concern and that the employee’s interest in free 
 
SELECTIONS FROM THE SPEECHES, LETTERS, JUDICIAL OPINIONS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, JR. xi-xiv (Richard Posner ed. 1992). 
22 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 567 (1968) (“Pickering’s claim that his letter was 
protected by the First Amendment was rejected [by the Illinois courts] on the ground that his 
acceptance of a teaching position in the public schools obliged him to refrain from making 
statements about the operation of the schools ‘which in the absence of such position he would have 
an undoubted right to engage in.’”). 
23 Id. at 568. 
24 Id. 
25 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
26 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605-606). 
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expression outweighs “the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”27 
In Connick v. Myers, in 1983, the Court addressed the claim of Sheila Myers, 
a district attorney fired after circulating a survey critical of management to fellow 
employees following a personnel decision to which she objected.28 Connick was 
the first case to “require[] a separate examination of the speech involved to 
determine whether the Pickering balancing test was to be applied.”29 Connick 
thus “made it more difficult for an employee to invoke the Pickering/Mount 
Healthy standard by holding that a threshold inquiry must be made to classify the 
speech as a matter of public concern.”30 
B. Circuit and Intra-Circuit Splits over the Definition of “Citizen 
Speech”
In trying to apply Connick’s distinction between speech made as a citizen 
and speech made as an employee, lower courts ran squarely into the question of 
whether there is ever a time when an employee speaks as a citizen in the course 
of doing her job. Analyzing more than 300 post-Connick cases addressing the 
question of what constituted speaking “on a matter of public concern,” Professor 
Steven Allred found in 1988 that  
[L]ower federal courts have been anything but 
consistent in their determination of what speech 
is protected under Connick v. Myers. Although 
broad categories of cases can be identified, there 
exist contradictions within every category, 
leaving public employees and employers 
 
27 Id. at 568. 
28 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 138 (1983). 
29 Steven Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public 
Concern, 64 IND. L. J. 43 (1988) (categorizing and analyzing lower court rulings in representative 
cases in which speech was about 1) matters of current community debate, 2) allegations of 
malfeasance or abuse of office, 3) public safety and welfare, 4) quality of public education, 5) 
discrimination, and 6) purely personal interest). 
30 Id. at 49, referencing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) 
(where employer would have reached the same decision for reasons besides the protected speech of 
the employee, protected speech that played some part in the employer’s decision does not shield 
employee from adverse employment decisions). 
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confused as to the scope of their free speech 
rights and responsibilities.31 
Part of the reason for the confusion, Professor Toni Massaro argues, is that 
“defining a ‘public concern’ is subjective.”32 
The Ninth Circuit’s Ceballos v. Garcetti ruling, which found that speech 
made within the scope of an employee’s duties can sometimes be citizen speech 
on matters of public interest worthy of First Amendment protection, described 
“nearly unanimous opposition” to a per se rule33 and noted that “the weight of 
authority in other circuits accords with our precedents.”34 It noted the sole 
exception of the Fourth Circuit, which “seems to be moving toward a [per se] 
rule.”35 
In the appeal of that decision to the Supreme Court, of course, matters were 
characterized differently.36 The petition for writ of certiorari described a “major 
inter-circuit conflict,”37 with the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits finding that speech 
made in the course of employment could in some circumstances qualify as 
speech made as a citizen on matters of public concern and therefore be 
constitutionally protected,38 and the Fourth and Fifth Circuits adopting an 
approach that focused on whether the speech was made in the speaker’s role as a 
citizen or her role as an employee (and if the latter, finding it automatically 
unprotected).39 Perhaps more interestingly, in the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and 
Tenth Circuits, different panels in the same circuit were applying Connick to 
 
31 Id. at 75. 
32 Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
33 Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d by 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Pet. for Writ of Cert. to the U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the 9th Cir., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 
1951 (2006) (No. 04-473). 
37 Id. at 14. 
38 Id. (citing Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1292 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding 
constitutionally protected a request from police officers to supervisor for permission to alert district 
attorney to others’ improper review of records)).  
39 Id. at 15 (citing Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding no First 
Amendment violations where a law banned state university faculty from accessing porn sites on 
publicly owned computers on the grounds that the regulation was of “speech clearly made in the 
employee’s role as employee”) and Gillum v. City of Kerrville, 3 F.3d 117, 120-21 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(finding no First Amendment protection for police officer who claimed retaliation after he had 
reported misconduct of chief to internal affairs department)). 
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markedly similar fact patterns and coming to different conclusions about whether 
speech was protected.40 
For example, the Seventh Circuit found no constitutional protection for 
speech made as part of Gerardo Gonzales’s work as a civilian doing 
investigations of police misconduct.41 Gonzales had alleged that after joining the 
police department, he himself was harassed and ultimately terminated by 
supervisors hostile to him based on earlier investigations of other police 
officers.42 The court found that Gonzales “was clearly acting entirely in an 
employment capacity when he made those reports.”43 
A different panel of Seventh Circuit judges came to a different conclusion in 
Jones v. Delgado,44 where a police officer whose job involved narcotics 
investigations suffered retaliation after disclosing allegations of drug activity by a 
person connected to the police chief.45 Because   “Delgado's investigation here 
was not a routine discharge of an assigned duty,” his First Amendment retaliation 
claim survived summary judgment.46 
40 Id. at 17. See also Tony Coppola, Content, Form and Context—The Eighth Circuit Misapplies 
the Connick Test in Examining the First Amendment Rights of a Public Employee in Buazard v. 
Meridith, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 417, 431-446 (2000) (discussing cases that illustrate the variety of 
approaches circuits were taking in interpreting Connick) and Marni M. Zack, Public Employee Free 
Speech: The Policy Reasons for Rejecting a Per Se Rule Precluding Speech Rights, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 
893 (2005). 
41 Gonzales v. City of Chicago, 239 F.3d 939, 940 (7th Cir. 2001). 
42 Id. at 940. 
43 Id. at 941. 
44 Delgado v. Jones, 95 Fed. Appx. 185 (7th Cir. Apr. 1, 2004).  
45 News accounts identified the person as the husband of a Milwaukee alderwoman who was a 
friend of the chief. (Gina Barton, “Other Suits from Jones Era Pending,” Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel, March 30, 2005, at B1. At http://www.jsonline.com/story/?id=313860.) In an earlier 
decision, the court had alluded to the reputation of the chief within the department for being quick 
to retaliate with unwanted transfers (in violation of Department rules); the court quoted the 
appellee’s brief: “Delgado then showed the letter to his supervising lieutenant, who commented: 
‘What district do you want to be transferred to?’”  Delgado was in fact transferred the day the chief 
learned of Delgado’s disclosure. Delgado, 282 F.3d at 514. 
46 The court found Delgado’s speech protected because he was outside his area of responsibility 
(routine narcotics investigations) and into internal affairs when he recommended an outside 
investigation of the allegations. It is unclear how the outside investigation Delgado recommended 
could be characterized as an “internal affairs” investigation when there was no allegation that any 
police officer was involved in the drug activity, and no cover-up or unlawful retaliation had 
occurred at the time Delgado disclosed the information. 
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C. Garcetti v. Ceballos
1. Background 
In 2000, a defense attorney filed a motion challenging a search warrant and 
asked Richard Ceballos, a calendar deputy47 in the Los Angeles County District 
Attorney’s office, to investigate what the defense attorney considered to be 
“inaccuracies in an affidavit” that was the basis for granting the warrant.48 The 
request was not an unusual one.49 When Ceballos, at the time an 11-year veteran 
of the office who had been promoted and supervised other attorneys, reviewed 
the affidavit, he was convinced that misrepresentations had been made to obtain 
the warrant.50 After a conversation with the deputy sheriff who had signed the 
affidavit, Ceballos wrote a memo detailing his reservations about the validity of 
the warrant and recommending that the case be dismissed, which his supervisor 
considered but ultimately decided against.51 With the knowledge of his 
supervisor, Ceballos turned over his memo, with his own opinions redacted, to 
the defense, on the assumption that he was obligated to do so under a leading 
case about prosecutors’ disclosure obligations.52 When the hearing on the warrant 
was held, Ceballos testified for the defense.53 The appellate court pointed out that 
at the search warrant hearing, the court “sustained the prosecution’s objections to 
several questions defense counsel asked [Ceballos,]” which left him unable to tell 
the reasons for his conclusions about the warrant.54 The judge upheld the validity 
of the warrant, saying that probable cause for the warrant was shown by other 
facts anyway and the disputed statements were irrelevant to the judge’s 
conclusion.55 
In the months following the hearing, Ceballos was demoted, stripped of his 
only homicide case, denied a promotion, and transferred to a branch that would 
 
47 Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1955 (describing a calendar deputy’s job as “exercis[ing] certain 
supervisory responsibilities over other lawyers” and, at the request of defense attorneys, 
“investigat[ing] aspects of pending cases”). 
48 Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1955. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 1956. There appears to have been some initial agreement that the warrant was flawed prior 
to the hearing on the motion to traverse. 
52 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring the disclosure by prosecutors of exculpatory 
evidence). 
53 Garcetti 126 S.Ct. at 1972. 
54 Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d by 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006). 
55 Garcetti 126 S.Ct. at 1972. 
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mean a longer commute.56 Never, however, did any of his supervisors openly 
reprimand him, put anything into his personnel file, or even make any argument 
that his actions had been reckless or inappropriate; the county contended that 
none of its actions were adverse employment actions, and none were taken in 
response to the conflict over the search warrant affidavit.57 It contended, 
however, that Ceballos’s supervisor could have done so because the speech in 
question—the memo, which Ceballos acknowledged was prepared “pursuant to 
his duties as a prosecutor”58—was not protected.59
Ceballos pursued an employee grievance over the alleged retaliation, but no 
retaliation was found and his claim was denied.60 
2. Ceballos v. Garcetti in the District and Appellate Courts 
Ceballos filed a First Amendment retaliation lawsuit in federal court and, 
after losing a summary judgment motion, appealed to the Ninth Circuit.61 The 
Ninth Circuit reversed, citing circuit precedent that rejected a per se application 
of Connick62 and noting, “a per se rule stripping all First Amendment protection 
from speech uttered in the performance of routine, as opposed to non-routine, job 
functions would be inconsistent with the very nature of the Connick test which 
contains a second step that requires us to balance various factors . . . .”63 Judge 
O’Scannlain concurred that precedent dictated the majority’s decision but argued 
that such precedents were wrong and should be overruled.64 He ridiculed the 
majority’s “seductively simple” argument that whistleblowing speech should be 
covered by the First Amendment because such speech is important and, in a tone 
dripping with sarcasm, wrote: 
 
56 Id. at 1956 and 1974 at n.13; the appellate court ruling mentions that retaliatory transfers are 
known in the DA’s office as “Freeway Therapy” (Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1171, n.2). 
57 Tr. of Oral Argument at 15, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006), Oct. 12, 2005 
(Petitioner’s counsel: “[I]t is not our position, and we have never taken the stance, that the deputy 
district attorney in this case was reckless in regards of his speech [interruption] or his evaluation”). 
58 Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1960, quoting Resp’t Br. at 4. 
59 Tr. of Oral Argument at 15. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006), Oct. 12, 2005 (“[I]t is 
our view that the supervisor–while the supervisor contended that he did not react to this speech 
adversely, that he could have.”). 
60 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1956. 
61 Ceballos, 361 F.3d 1168. 
62 Roth v. Veteran’s Admin. of United States, 856 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1988). 
63 Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1176. 
64 Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1194 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
BICE, TOUGH TALK 11
How strange it must now be for the hundreds, if 
not thousands, of legislators throughout this 
country who have voted to enact or retain 
[whistleblowing] laws now to discover that their 
votes were essentially meaningless—that the 
First Amendment already provided public 
employees with protections co-extensive with, 
and in many respects even greater than those 
purportedly conferred by, the legislation they 
crafted and helped shepherd through their state 
legislative processes.65 
3. The Supreme Court Takes the Case  
The question before the Supreme Court when it granted certiorari concerned 
only the status of the speech in the disposition memo; the instances of Ceballos’s 
other speech—his comments to the bar association (which in any event occurred 
after the employment actions), his conversation with his supervisors about the 
case, and his testimony at the hearing on the motion to traverse—were not 
addressed.66 
The case proceeded on a schedule that coincided with critical turnover on the 
Court. Oral arguments were first heard October 12, 2005, and the case was 
scheduled for reargument March 21, 2006, following Justice O’Connor’s 
retirement and the confirmation of her replacement, Justice Alito.67 The decision 
to schedule a reargument was seen by some as an indication that the court was 
evenly split without Justice O’Connor’s vote.68 The ruling was handed down 
 
65 Id. at 1192 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).  
66 The Ninth Circuit opinion stated, “[W]e hold that, for purposes of summary judgment, Ceballos’s 
allegations of wrongdoing in the memorandum constitute protected speech under the First 
Amendment; accordingly, we need not determine here whether similar protection should be 
afforded to his other communications. Those matters are best explored at trial.” Ceballos, 361 F.3d 
1168, 1173. 
67 David L. Hudson, Jr., “The Return of the Reargument: Supreme Court to Hear Again a Key 
Employee Free Speech Case,” ABA Journal eReport, March 17, 2006. 
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/m17employ.html. 
68 Id. (quoting Georgetown University law professor Martin Lederman as saying, "It is likely that 
Garcetti is the only one of the 20 outstanding cases in which Justice O’Connor’s vote was 
determinative—in other words, in which the court is divided 4-4 without her vote.") New York 
Times reporter Linda Greenhouse wrote that “[t]he reality may have been more complex,” citing 
Justice Breyer’s separate dissent and suggesting that his vote “may have been uncertain until late in 
the process.” Linda Greenhouse, Some Whistle-Blowers Lose Free-Speech Protections, N. Y. 
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May 30, 2006, the majority opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy and 
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.69 
The Court reversed the finding of First Amendment protection for the memo 
written to recommend dismissing the disputed criminal case and remanded for 
the appellate court to take up Ceballos’s remaining claims.  
The majority held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to 
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.”70 It focused on the relationship of 
the speech in question to the speaker’s responsibilities as an employee: 
The controlling factor in Ceballos’s case is that 
his expressions were made pursuant to his duties 
as a calendar deputy.  . . . That consideration—
the fact that Ceballos spoke as a prosecutor 
fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor 
about how best to proceed with a pending 
case—distinguishes Ceballos’s case from those 
in which the First Amendment provides 
protection against discipline.71 
The majority also dwells at length on the needs of government as an 
employer and the havoc it says would ensue if speech such as Ceballos’s were 
constitutionally protected. To object, as the appellate court had,72 that it is a 
doctrinal anomaly to leave unprotected the same speech made in the context of 
the workplace that is protected when made in a public forum “misconceives the 
theoretical underpinnings of [the Court’s] decisions,” the majority sniffed.  
The opinion’s last paragraphs, however, reveal Garcetti’s Achilles’ heel: 
“We have no occasion to articulate a comprehensive framework for defining the 
scope of an employee’s duties in cases where there is room for serious debate.”73 
Beyond noting that a written job description is “neither necessary nor sufficient” 
and differentiating between formal job descriptions and the duties an employee 
 
TIMES, May 31, 2006, at A16.  
69 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1954. 
70 Id. at 1960. 
71 Id. at 1959-60. 
72 The same objection was raised in Justice Stevens’s dissent, id. at 1963. 
73 Id. at 1961. 
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“actually is expected to perform,”74 the Court gave little guidance for resolving 
what will likely be a highly litigated question.75 
It was accompanied by a dissent written by Justice Souter (joined by Justices 
Ginsburg and Stevens), as well as dissents by Justices Stevens and Breyer.76 
Justice Souter’s dissent recognized the “tension between individual and public 
interests”77 but advocated for something that could be dubbed a “Pickering plus” 
analysis:  
“[T]he risks to the government are great enough 
for us to hold from the outset that an employee 
commenting on subjects in the course of duties 
should not prevail on balance unless he speaks 
on a matter of unusual importance and satisfies 
high standards of responsibility in the way he 
does it. . . .  [I]t is fair to say that only comment 
on official dishonesty, deliberately 
unconstitutional action, other serious 
wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety can 
weigh out in an employee’s favor.”78 
Justice Stevens’s dissent considered the controlling precedent to be Givhan v. 
Western Line Consolidated School District, which he noted was a unanimous 
opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist.79 In Givhan, a conversation a teacher 
had with a principal concerning the administration’s racism was found to be 
protected speech.80 “Our silence as to whether or not her speech was made 
pursuant to her job duties demonstrates that the point was immaterial,” Stevens 
 
74 Id. at 1962. 
75 Kathleen Sullivan, professor and former dean of Stanford Law School, once observed: “Rule 
choices are suspicious, and in the end rules never hold. Turn the page and you’ll find the codifier 
scrambling for an exception. This is because general propositions cannot decide concrete cases . . . 
.” Kathleen Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) 
(identifying the “key fault lines along which the Reagan and Bush appointees fractured” during the 
previous term as “a split over the choice of rules or standards”). 
76 Id. at 1963. With a Court highly divided on this question, it is conceivable that if the Court were 
to revisit the issue in the near future, a case with an only slightly different set of facts might well 
come out a different way. 
77 Id. at 1965. 
78 Id. at 1967. 
79 Id. at 1963. 
80 Id., citing Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).  
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wrote. “That is equally true today, for it is senseless to let constitutional 
protection for exactly the same words hinge on whether they fall within a job 
description.”81 
Justice Breyer found the majority’s rule “too absolute” and Justice Souter’s 
proffered standard no real improvement over Pickering because it was still too 
broad and ultimately saved courts no time.82 He argued that constitutional 
protection was not precluded when a government employee speaks about matters 
of public concern “in the course of ordinary job-related duties”83 and said 
Pickering is the appropriate analysis in such a case. 
II.  The Early Returns: How Courts Are Applying Garcetti’s So-Called 
“Per Se Rule”  
Much of the debate about the issues raised in Garcetti has been framed in 
terms of whether Pickering and Connick are properly read to require a so-called 
“per se rule”—that speech made “as an employee” is per se excluded from First 
Amendment protection.  Disparaging reference is made to a “per se rule” seven 
times in the Ninth Circuit’s decision on Ceballos’s case, and the dissent quotes a 
Tenth Circuit decision using the phrase.84 Though the phrase is nowhere to be 
found in the Supreme Court opinion or in any of the dissents, the term has been 
widely used as shorthand for the concept that speech made in the course of 
employment is automatically unprotected for purposes of Pickering analysis.85 
The term “per se,” defined as “standing alone, without reference to additional 
facts,”86 seems ill-suited for describing the Garcetti rule. As the Court’s decision 
indicated, courts still need to make a “proper inquiry” into the question of what 
the employee is “actually expected to do.”87 While the new test adds a twist to 
the Connick analysis, it is unclear whether it does more than create more 
deference in the employer’s favor—as a thumb on the scale of the Pickering 
balancing test. As Ceballos’s counsel pointed out in oral argument, “[A]ll this per 
se rule does is add complexity and the need for greater factual development. It’s 
 
81 Id. at 1963. 
82 Id. at 1974-1975. 
83 Id. at 1976. 
84 E.g., “The proposed per se rule would be particularly detrimental to whistleblowers . . . .” 
Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d by 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006). 
85 E.g., Marni Zack, Public Employee Free Speech: The Policy Reasons for Rejecting a Per Se Rule 
Precluding Speech Rights, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 893 (2005). 
86 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).  
87 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961. 
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not the magic bullet that the Petitioners seem to think it is.”88 Yale Law School 
professor Jack Balkin89 stated, following Garcetti, “I am sympathetic to the 
Court's desire to reduce the burden of ad hoc balancing by creating a bright line 
rule of no protection. But in this case, the Court's decision doesn't really create a 
bright line rule, because the boundaries of what is within an employee's job 
description may turn out to be quite contestable, and will be contested in future 
cases.”90 
In this way, Garcetti resembles Connick and other tests designed to block 
disfavored types of cases. Analogous developments can be found in 
administrative law in the application of Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.91 As Professor Cass Sunstein has observed, a seemingly 
straightforward test can get bogged down in the threshold inquiry: does the test 
even apply in this case?  
Chevron famously creates a two-step inquiry for 
courts to follow in reviewing agency 
interpretations. . . . It is an understatement to say 
that a great deal of judicial and academic 
attention has been paid to the foundations and 
meaning of Chevron’s two-step inquiry. But in 
the last period, the most important and confusing 
questions have involved neither step. Instead 
they involve Chevron Step Zero—the initial 
inquiry into whether the Chevron framework 
applies at all.92 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions attempting to clarify the Chevron test 
reflected, Sunstein said, “an intense and longstanding disagreement . . . involving 
a classic rules-standards debate [that] echoes throughout the law.”93 Such echoes 
can be heard in the rulings and dissents of First Amendment cases following 
Pickering, including Garcetti.
88 Tr. of Oral Argument at 44. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006) (March 21, 2006). 
89 Jack Balkin is Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment at Yale Law 
School. http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/index.htm. 
90 Jack Balkin, “Ceballos—The Court creates bad information policy.” May 30, 2006. 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/05/ceballos-court-creates-bad-information.html. 
91 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
92 Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006). 
93 Id. 
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There is a subset of cases that survives summary judgment under 
Pickering/Connick but fails to survive under Garcetti,94 but the number of post-
Garcetti decisions that have focused on the opinion’s requirement of a fact-
intensive inquiry shows it would be naïve to expect the decision to curb litigation 
of First Amendment claims.95 
A. Appellate Courts
Garcetti has been cited to affirm cases in which the plaintiff appealed after 
having lost under the Pickering test in the court below. (One can also envision 
cases that survive summary judgment under Garcetti and Pickering in district 
court being reversed on appeal.) But the dismissal of at least one case that had 
failed Pickering in the lower court was reversed under a somewhat 
counterintuitive reading of Garcetti.
During June and July 2006, the Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits issued 
rulings96 that cited Garcetti in affirming lower courts’ summary judgment 
rulings. These rulings were hardly surprising; plaintiffs who had lost the Connick 
and Pickering analyses would not be expected to prevail under an even narrower 
test. 
The Third Circuit, however, reversed a dismissal of a First Amendment claim 
by a borough manager alleging retaliation by the mayor,97 saying that it was 
 
94 For cases that fail Pickering/Connick tests on the grounds that the employee’s interest in the 
protected free speech are outweighed by the employer’s interests, the Garcetti rule obviously 
makes no difference. 
95 Another possible explanation for the lower courts’ hesitation to use Garcetti to dismiss what they 
may see as close cases is suggested by an argument made by Professor Dan Kahan of Yale Law 
School in the context of legislation and social change. Kahan’s thesis is that “[a]s severity of 
condemnation . . . increases, the percentage of decisionmakers who are willing to enforce the law 
declines.” He suggests that corrective actions that are perceived as overly harsh are ultimately 
counter-productive. As applied in the context of Supreme Court precedents, his theory would 
suggest that lower courts that perceive a Supreme Court rule as resulting in injustice in individual 
cases would seek ways to distinguish them. Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving 
the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000). 
96 Mills v. City of Evansville, No. 05-3207, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 15082 (7th Cir. June 20, 2006) 
(affirming dismissal where police officer was transferred after expressing opposition to changes in 
department policy); Bailey v. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 451 F.3d 514 (8th Cir. 
2006) (affirming dismissal of claim by consultant who objected to the handling of state disability 
benefits claims); Gilder-Lucas v. Elmore County Bd. of Educ., No. 05-16561, 2006 Lexis U.S. 
App. 16167 (11th Cir. June 26, 2006) (affirming dismissal of claim by high school junior varsity 
cheerleader sponsor who alleged retaliatory non-renewal of contract after she raised concerns to 
principal about the fairness of cheerleading tryouts). 
97 Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, No. 05-1356, 2006 WL 2061145 (3rd Cir. July 26, 2006). 
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premature for the district court to determine as a matter of law that some of the 
speech was not protected: “[The employee’s] First Amendment claim, insofar as 
it is premised on [his] advocacy and support for ideas, principles and projects 
[the mayor] disfavored, should not have been dismissed at this stage of the 
proceeding.”98 The Circuit upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff’s First 
Amendment claim as to reports of the supervisor’s harassing behavior the 
employee had made to the Borough Council on the grounds that the plaintiff’s 
own brief had said that he “as part of his duties as Manager and otherwise duly 
reported them,”99 which killed the claim under Garcetti. That the speech related 
to carrying out the projects of the borough, such as a telecommunications project, 
is not ruled out as protected speech, and speech made to the borough council 
about an elected official is ruled out as protected speech is, to say the least, 
counterintuitive. It illustrates, however, that lower courts are going about 
defining “pursuant to duties” as less of a per se rule than the Garcetti Court 
seemed to intend.  
B. District Courts 
1. Cases in Which Garcetti Ends the Analysis 
Summary judgment ended some claims when Garcetti was decided 
where courts found the plaintiff’s job included reporting the kind of wrongdoing 
that was claimed as the basis for subsequent retaliation. 
Ruotolo v. City of New York: If there is a case 
that embodies equally the concerns of Garcetti’s 
fans and foes, it might be the case of Angelo 
Ruotolo, a Bronx cop whose First Amendment 
claim, just two weeks from trial after three years 
of litigation, went down in flames thanks to 
Garcetti.100 In 1999, Ruotolo had, in his capacity 
as Training and Safety Officer, written a report 
about the department’s leaking gasoline storage 
tanks and suggested a link between the resulting 
on-the-job chemical exposure and health 
problems of officers.101 Though he alleged that 
 
98 Id. at *11. 
99 Id. 
100 Ruotolo v. City of New York, No. 03 CIV. 5045 (SHS), 2006 WL 2033662 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 
2006). 
101 Id. at *1. 
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the City of New York apparently viewed his 
concerns as valid and worked to resolve the 
problems, he soon began receiving transfers and 
discipline, and, for the first time in his 20-year 
career with the department, received a negative 
performance review.102 Fearing the complete 
loss of his pension if he were fired, he retired 
voluntarily.103 His First Amendment claim of 
retaliation had survived motions to dismiss and 
motions for summary judgment. When Garcetti 
was handed down, however, the motion to 
dismiss was renewed,104 and this time the court 
granted it, saying, “[s]ince Ruotolo prepared his 
Report in the course of his employment duties, 
his speech is exactly the type addressed in 
Garcetti; i.e., employer commissioned work 
over which the employer is entitled to exercise 
control.”105 
Donnell v. City of Cedar Rapids106: Here 
Garcetti was used not to determine whether the 
speech in a First Amendment claim was 
protected but to arrive at a finding of qualified 
immunity for a defendant in a whistleblower 
case. The case involved allegations of 
deliberately lax enforcement of building 
codes,107 and the only evidence the court could 
find of a “habit or practice” of violating free 
 
102 Id. at *2. An earlier decision details the claims of retaliation, which allegedly included 
demotions, some 140 reassignments over a nine-month period, including a transfer to the most 
violent precinct in the city, and discipline for such infractions as “sitting at an unassigned desk or 
using an overly-narrow margin on a typed report.” Ruotolo, 2005 WL 1253936 at *1-2. The case 
also received press attention. See Helen Peterson, “140 Transfers Fuel Sgt’s $1.2M Beef vs. 
NYPD,” New York Daily News, July 9, 2003. 
103 Ruotolo, 2005 WL 1253936 at *1-2. 
104 Id. at *1. 
105 Id. at *3. 
106 Donnell v. City of Cedar Rapids, No. 05-CV-49LRR, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 35722 (N.D. Ia. 
June 1, 2006). 
107 Id. 
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speech rights was the defendant’s “repeated 
attempts to shield preferred contractors from 
[plaintiff’s] inspections and citations.”108 The 
court granted summary judgment on qualified 
immunity grounds, citing Garcetti for the 
proposition that those actions did not count as 
violations because “[p]laintiff has no free speech 
interest in performing the duties of his job . . . 
.”109 
Logan v. Indiana Department of Corrections110:
The statements of a correctional facility 
healthcare administrator about “persistent 
serious problems with nursing care for the 
inmates”111 were found unprotected because her 
job description included “evaluating the 
provision of all medical services to prevent 
inappropriate use or duplication.”112 It was not 
found relevant that the plaintiff “had no direct 
responsibility for the state’s nursing personnel 
decisions.”113 
It should be noted that in several cases in which the claim failed on the 
grounds that the statements involved were “made pursuant to the employee’s 
official duties,” that conclusion was supported by reference to the plaintiff’s own 
written statements, including pleadings made in the case. One plaintiff included 
in a letter to defendant the statement, “I consider any time I spend addressing this 
matter with you or the agency to be services I am giving the state as a 
consultant,”114 which the court cited as evidence that the statement was made “as 
an employee concerned with being paid for his time.”115 Another had submitted a 
report with officious and self-defeating thoroughness, noting that the report was 
 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 65, n.13. 
110 Logan v. Indiana Dep’t of Corrections, No. 1:04-cv-0797-SEB-JPG, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
43631 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 2006). 
111 Id. at *6. 
112 Id. at *5. 
113 Id. at *5. 
114 Bailey v. Dept. of Elementary & Secondary Education, 451 F.3d 514, 520 (8th Cir. 2006). 
115 Id. 
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“submitted pursuant to Interim Order 45, dated 10-19-99, wherein the Training 
Sergeant is designated the Command Safety Officer on matters relating to 
occupational safety”; in the subject line, he had written “Survey Pursuant to 
Request”; and in the report he had explained who requested it.116 (As the court 
responded in that case, “[i]t is clear beyond peradventure that the Report was 
prepared as part of plaintiff’s official duties.”117) Another plaintiff’s brief stated, 
“Plaintiff as part of his duties as Manager and otherwise duly reported 
[harassment of employees by a supervising official] . . . .”118
The plaintiff’s choice of phrasing proved fatal to these claims. While such 
statements by plaintiffs may have made for an easy post-Garcetti call, no 
responsible plaintiff’s counsel should make the mistake of using such phrases in 
the future. 
 2. The Cases Garcetti Is Not Ending  
In Garcetti, the plaintiff did “not dispute that he prepared the memorandum 
‘pursuant to his duties as a prosecutor.’”119 It is unlikely that future plaintiffs will 
follow his lead. Where that fact is disputed, it falls to the court to decide it. 
Several lower courts have refused defendants summary judgment on the 
question, deciding either that the plaintiff’s circumstances were distinguishable 
from Garcetti or that there were insufficient facts in evidence to make the call. 
Kodrea v. City of Kokomo120: A supervisor 
allegedly fired Kodrea in response to Kodrea’s 
reports of an apparent kickback scheme and the 
presence of an employee under his supervision 
who was on the payroll but was not actually 
working.121 His retaliation claim survived a 
summary judgment motion because, the court 
found, “[u]nlike the situation in Garcetti . . . 
there is a factual dispute in this case concerning 
whether Kodrea’s complaints . . .  were made 
pursuant to his ordinary duties. As Kodrea notes, 
 
116 Ruotolo, 2006 WL 2033662 at *3. 
117 Id. 
118 Hill, 2006 WL 2061145 at *11. 
119 Garcetti 126 S.Ct. at 1960. 
120 Kodrea v. City of Kokomo, No. 1:04-cv-1843-LJM-WTL, 2006 WL 1750071 (S.D. Ind. June 
22, 2006).  
121 Id. at *4. 
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nothing in his job description required him to 
monitor or report misconduct.”122 
Day v. Borough of Carlisle123: A police officer 
alleged retaliatory termination after confronting 
a supervisor about the department’s failure to 
investigate allegations of criminal acts by other 
officers.124 The court noted that neither the 
subject matter nor the place of the statements 
was dispositive before concluding, “[a]lthough 
the record indicates that Plaintiff had 
supervisory responsibility over junior officers, 
and it may be inferred that he had a duty to 
report disciplinary problems to his superiors, 
Plaintiff has not alleged that he was duty-bound 
to report or investigate infractions by those 
persons who were the subject of his 
statements.”125 
Batt v. City of Oakland126: A court denied 
summary judgment in case involving a rookie 
police officer alleging First Amendment claims 
after reporting egregious criminal misconduct by 
the officers who were training him.127 Making 
reference to the language in Garcetti that 
discusses the difference between “formal job 
descriptions” and “the duties an employee 
actually is expected to perform,” the court 
determined that, given the evidence of a culture 
to the contrary, the department’s assertions that 
 
122 Id. at *8. 
123 Day v. Borough of Carlisle, No. CIVA 1:CV04-1040, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 46434 (M.D. Pa. 
July 10, 2006). 
124 Id. at *4. 
125 Id. at *18. 
126 Batt v. City of Oakland, No. C 02-04975 MHP 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 47889, (N.D. Cal. July 12, 
2006). 
127 Id. at *1 (“during plaintiff’s two-week tenure . . . he witnessed numerous illegal and brutal acts 
on the part of his supervising officer and three other OPD officers” as well as “deliberate 
falsification of police reports”). 
BICE, TOUGH TALK 22
reporting police misconduct was an official duty 
of the employee were not dispositive.128 
Locklear v. Person County Board129: A principal 
alleged retaliation in response to her having 
voiced concerns about a new test score policy 
initiated by the administration. She spoke about 
her  concerns in a private meeting with her 
immediate supervisor and in a meeting with her 
staff.130 The court dismissed other claims but 
refused to dismiss the claim of First Amendment 
retaliation, saying, “the record is not sufficiently 
developed at this stage of the case to determine 
whether Dr. Locklear’s speech was made 
pursuant to her official duties.”131 
Wilcoxon v. Red Clay Consolidated School 
District Board of Education132: Here the court 
not only denied defendant’s motion to dismiss 
but added an explicit finding that a journal kept 
by the plaintiff “was protected speech within the 
meaning of the First Amendment.”133 The 
teacher had documented a colleague’s frequent 
absences in a private journal kept in his desk.134 
When the document was discovered by a school 
official, he faced retaliation, including 
nonrenewal of his contract. The court found 
Garcetti irrelevant because “[p]laintiff’s journal 
containing the absences of a fellow teacher was 
 
128 Id. at *12. 
129 Locklear v. Person County Board of Education, No. 1:05CV00255, 2006 WL 1743460 (M.D. 
N.C. June 22, 2006). 
130 Id. at *9. 
131 Id. 
132 Wilcoxon v. Red Clay Consolidated School Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. CIV. 05-524SLR, 2006 WL 
1793546 (D. Del. June 30, 2006). 
133 Id. at *6. 
134 Id. at *2 and 4. The plaintiff indicated he had kept the documentation in order to protect himself 
in the event that a student was injured due to the lack of supervision resulting from the colleague’s 
absence. 
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not written pursuant to his official duties as  a 
teacher. He was not employed to monitor the 
absences of fellow teachers . . . .”135 The court 
found that the information about the no-show 
teacher on the public payroll was a matter of 
public concern and the “personal nature” of the 
plaintiff’s speech—a private journal—did not 
“vitiate the status of the statement as addressing 
a matter of public concern.”136 
Without reading too much into early returns (the courts’ hesitation to grant 
summary judgment may reflect nothing more than caution in interpreting a recent 
ruling and the plaintiff-friendly standard in early stages of litigation), there is 
reason to believe Garcetti is less pro-employer than it would initially appear. 
Courts are interpreting Garcetti as a recognition that an employer’s word about 
an employee’s official duties is not dispositive, giving plaintiffs some leverage to 
resist dismissal and summary judgment. 
 3. Initial Confusion 
Courts wishing to evade a higher court ruling rarely do so openly.137 And 
it is not uncommon for it to take a while for the dust to settle after a Supreme 
Court ruling. As one court noted, “I have no doubt that many courts will struggle 
to define the breadth of Garcetti and its impact on First Amendment 
jurisprudence.”138 It is unclear whether a desire to evade or mere confusion was 
to blame where a court addressed a teacher’s claim of retaliation for having worn 
a t-shirt at school drawing attention to a union contract dispute.139 The court 
quoted Garcetti at some length but failed entirely to conduct the relevant 
 
135 Id. at *5.  
136 Id. at *6 (quoting Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414-416 (1979)). 
137 Lower courts rarely disagree with Supreme Court holdings, at least in published opinions. One 
departure from this general rule was Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2000), in which 
the appellate panel took exception in a footnote to the Supreme Court’s reading of Fisher v. Vassar 
College, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997), an en banc decision: “It is arguable that the Supreme 
Court’s reading of Fisher was inaccurate. . . . In any event, any possible disagreement . . . is 
rendered moot by Reeves, which now becomes our principal guide on these questions.” Schnabel,
232 F.3d at 89, n.5. 
138 Hailey v. City of Camden, No. 01-3967, 2006 WL 1875402 (D. N.J. July 5, 2006) at *16. 
139 Montle v. Westwood Heights School Dist., No. 05-10137-BC, 2006 WL 1663304 (E.D. Mich. 
June 15, 2006). 
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analysis.  Instead, the court proceeded directly to the Pickering balancing test,140 
appearing to read Garcetti as requiring no additional analysis but merely 
restating the two sides of the balancing test.141 
III.  Where Garcetti Forecloses First Amendment Protection: What Now? 
Even if an unexpected number of employee First Amendment claims survive 
dismissal and summary judgment motions under post-Garcetti analysis, there 
remains a subset of claimants who now find no First Amendment protection 
because they are explicitly charged with reporting misconduct and thus almost 
any speech about wrongdoing can be seen as “pursuant to their official duties.” 
The position articulated at oral arguments and in the majority opinion echoes the 
reasoning of Judge O’Scannlain’s dissent from the Ninth Circuit decision: 
internal whistleblower speech should be protected somehow, just never by the 
First Amendment.142 At the second oral argument in Garcetti, counsel arguing as 
amicus curiae for the U.S. responded to a hypothetical from Justice Souter about 
a prosecutor ordered by a superior not to turn over potentially exculpatory 
material as required by law: “Well, there would no doubt be other restrictions. . . 
. The first amendment would not be the—would not be the source of 
protection.”143 The Garcetti majority referred to “a powerful network of 
legislative enactments—such as whistleblower protection laws and labor codes—
available to those who seek to expose wrongdoing.”144 There is also assurance in 
the text of the Court’s decision, of “some possibility of First Amendment 
protection” for external whistleblower speech.145 These claims are worth a closer 
look. 
 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at *2. Citing Garcetti twice, but never mentioning its holding, the court wrote: “As the 
Supreme Court explained just last month, ‘public employees do not surrender all their First 
Amendment rights by reason of their employment. . . . However ‘when a citizen enters government 
service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom. Government 
employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees’ words 
and actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services.’” 
(citations omitted) 
142 Ceballos 361 F. 3d. at 1192-93 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (“Those who ‘blow the whistle’ on 
government corruption or mismanagement do deserve reasonable legal protections . . . .”). 
143 Tr. of Oral Argument at 22, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006). March 21, 2006. 
144 Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1962. 
145 Id. at 1961. 
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A. The Insufficiency of Whistleblower Statutes
A full analysis of federal and state whistleblower statutes is beyond the scope 
of this Article; however, even a cursory investigation reveals that expecting 
existing law to protect legitimate whistleblower claims is at best naïve, at worst, 
facetious. 
As Justice Souter noted in dissent, “the majority’s counsel to rest easy fails 
on its own terms.”146 After citing a series of cases in which whistleblower law 
afforded no protection, he added, “[m]ost significantly, federal employees have 
been held to be unprotected for statements made in connection with normal 
employment duties, the very speech that the majority says will be covered . . . 
.”147 
The gaps in federal law are matched by gaps in state law; at oral argument, 
counsel for Ceballos described the state of whistleblower laws as “a complete hit-
or-miss situation across the country.”148 For example, Iowa’s whistleblower 
statute creates a private cause of action when a government employee is 
discharged in reprisal for disclosing “information [that] evidences a violation of 
law or rule, mismanagement, a gross abuse of funds, an abuse of authority, or a 
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety . . . .”149 In Indiana, no 
private right of action exists at all; although the statute provides that “a public 
employer may not terminate an employee for reporting in writing a violation of 
law or misuse of public resources,” the employee’s remedy is limited to 
“appealing any disciplinary action.”150 Thus, when an Indiana employee was 
fired for “reporting in writing a violation of law or misuse of public resources,” 
and filed constitutional and state claims, the claims made under the state 
whistleblower statute, far from being the most protective of the employee, were 
instead the ones that were dismissed first.151 It was only the plaintiff’s First 
Amendment claim that survived.152 New York’s statute, Labor Law Section 740, 
is similarly unavailing. It has been called “probably the most restrictive and 
 
146 Id. at 1970. (Souter, J. dissenting) 
147 Id. at 1971 (citing Huffman v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1352 (C.A. Fed. 
2001). 
148 Tr. of Oral Argument at 39, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006). March 21, 2006. 
149 Iowa Code § 70A.29. 
150 Indiana Code § 36-1-8-8(c) and (d). 
151 Kodrea, 2006 WL 1750071, at *15. 
152 Id. at *8. 
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arcane” of state whistleblower laws.153 The law has been found not to cover 
employees “opposing Medicare billing improprieties,” “fraudulent billing 
practices,” “fiscal improprieties,” “disclosure of medical records,” or “fraudulent 
banking activities,” as none of these activities “involve immediate threat to 
public health and safety.”154 The state’s Civil Service Law, which covers public 
employee whistleblowing, is slightly less restrictive but protects only internal, 
and never public, disclosures.155 
B. Reporting Misconduct to the Press Or to External Authorities: A     
Catch-22
It has been observed that “[c]ommunications with the news media 
concerning allegations of misconduct by public officials or employees are among 
the most jealously guarded forms of free speech.”156 The Garcetti majority took 
care to note, “[e]mployees who make public statements outside the course of 
performing their official duties retain some possibility of First Amendment 
protection because that is the kind of activity engaged in by citizens who “do not 
work for the government. The same goes for writing a letter to a local 
newspaper.”157 
Other courts have taken pains to note that even when First Amendment rights 
are curtailed within the public workplace, the freedom to contact the press is 
unquestioned.158 But this freedom is an illusory one. Professor Jack Balkin 
summed up the realities facing a would-be whistleblower after Garcetti thus: 
[E]mployees will have incentives not to use such 
procedures but to speak only in public if they 
want First Amendment protections (note that if 
they speak both privately and publicly, they can 
 
153 Wayne N. Outten et al., Overview of Workplace Claims in New York: Perspective’s of 
Employees’ Counsel, in 30th Annual Institute on Employment Law 1210 (PLI LITIG. & ADMIN.
PRACTICE, COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES NO. 662, 2001). 
154 Scott Moss, Where There’s At-Will, There are Many Ways: Redressing The Increasing 
Incoherence of Employment At Will. 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 295, 311 & n.70. 
155 Id. at n.73. 
156 Leon Friedman, First Amendment Retaliation 59 (PLI LITIG. ADMIN. PRACTICE COURSE 
HANDBOOK SERIES NO. 6700, 2005). 
157 Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1961. 
158 E.g., “In contrast, when the same assistant district attorney writes a letter to the editor of the 
local newspaper to expose a pattern of prosecutorial malfeasance, the speech is entitled to 
constitutional protection because it is made in the employee's capacity as a private citizen and 
touches on matters of public concern.” Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 408 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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be fired for their private speech). However, if 
they speak only publicly, they essentially forfeit 
their ability to stay in their jobs, first because 
they become pariahs, and second, because they 
have refused to use the employer's internal 
mechanisms for complaint (mechanisms which, 
if they used them, would eliminate their First 
Amendment rights). In short, whatever they do, 
they are pretty much screwed.159 
Counsel for the defendant acknowledged this Catch-22 when asked at oral 
arguments about how an employee who goes public with allegations of 
misconduct fares under the First Amendment160:
“[I]n some respects, if you're talking about job-
required speech that you are -- part of those 
duties, and the function, is to keep it internally 
until at least there's some decision by the 
supervisor, and, rather than do that, you send it 
to the press or leak that information out, I think a 
governmental disruption in efficiency can be 
presumed there. So, I don't think it's as -- I don't 
think it's as clear that that -- that Mr. Ceballos 
would have ultimately prevailed under the 
[Pickering] balancing. I mean, if he had taken 
the [interrupted] . . . the speech externally, I 
think there -- that he ultimately would have lost, 
as well . . . .”161 
As plaintiff’s counsel bluntly put it: “It’s a trap.”162 
159 Jack Balkin, “Ceballos—The Court creates bad information policy,” May 30, 2006.  
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/05/ceballos-court-creates-bad-information.html. A related Catch-
22 has been pointed out by Professor Toni Massaro: To avoid the characterization of a problem as a 
single employee’s grievance, an employee would need to seek the support of other employees; 
doing so, however, can create the kind of disruption that weighs in the employer’s favor in a 
retaliation claim. Recall that Myers, the plaintiff in Connick, “was accused of provoking a ‘mini-
insurrection.’” Toni Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector 
Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 24 (1987). 
160 Tr. of Oral Argument at 17, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006). March 21, 2006. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 18. 
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Reporting problems internally first also means it would be impossible for the 
employee subsequently to give the information to an external source, whether the 
press or a government official, and remain anonymous. Under Garcetti, the safest 
avenue—still risky and not especially efficient—may well be “to speak 
anonymously or leak information to reporters and hope that the reporters don't 
have to reveal their sources.”163 This is an odd incentive being created by a 
decision—Garcetti—premised on the importance of smooth workplace 
functioning and employee loyalty. 
There are also many circumstances where an anonymous tip is simply 
insufficient to expose wrongdoing. Popular Deep Throat-inspired understandings 
of how the media work notwithstanding, there are many circumstances in which 
taking a story public either requires identifying a source or makes the source’s 
identity easy to determine.164 
IV. Revisiting Pickering, Connick, and Garcetti with a Focus on Public
Interest
Connick has been criticized for dragging Pickering into a quagmire by 
drawing unworkable distinctions between employee speech and citizen speech.165 
163 Balkin, “Ceballos,” http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/05/ceballos-court-creates-bad-
information.html. In “Ceballos and Public Speech: Response to Roosevelt,” June 1, 2006, 
Georgetown Law professor Marty Lederman discusses how risky this approach has become in light 
of recent government efforts to force reporters to reveal sources. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justice 
Dept. is Criticized by Ex-Official on Subpoenas, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2006, at A16. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/01/washington/01chronicle.html?ex=1154404800&en=650ecaf4
c47d68bf&ei=5070. 
164 A tip about incriminating public documents can lead a reporter to file an FOIA request, and the 
source’s anonymity is undisturbed. However, that approach is ineffectual in many situations, 
including those involving destroyed public documents or non-public documents beyond the reach 
of an FOIA.  
165 E.g., Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007 
(2005) (calling current free speech doctrine “fundamentally flawed” and advocating full protection 
for “external” speech and no protection for “internal” speech with four specific exceptions); 
Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible Content Discrimination Under the First Amendment: The 
Strange Case of the Public Employee, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 529 (1998) (arguing that a better 
test would require an employer to show “an interest unrelated to suppressing an employee’s beliefs 
about management” modeled on United States v. O’Brien); Stephen Allred, From Connick to 
Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 Ind. L. J. 43 (1988) 
(advocating a “return to Pickering” without the narrowing effects of Connick, and allowing any 
speech that addresses a matter of public concern to be subject to the balancing test); Toni Massaro, 
Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 
(1987) (advocating protection of all speech, on both private and public matters, unless “any 
government interests exist that might justify restriction of the speech . . . .” Id. at 68.) 
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Yet that much-criticized distinction was retained, and made even more pivotal, in 
Garcetti.
Following the path paved in Connick and forgoing the less-traveled-by 
Givhan,166 the Garcetti majority is content to draw a line that will have the effect 
of shutting out some employees who expose government wrongdoing before any 
Pickering balancing analysis can be undertaken. This in spite of the fact that the 
distinction between employee speech and citizen speech, always flimsy, is at its 
weakest where a person is criticizing government corruption, and in spite of the 
fact that such employees are often uniquely positioned to share information of 
great public interest. The Court’s statement that such employees retain “some 
possibility” of First Amendment protection when they pursue external channels 
only emphasizes how little assurance there is of doing so. As Jack Balkin has 
pointed out, “[T]he effect of the Court's decision is to create very strong 
incentives against whistleblowing of any kind.”167 
Justice Souter would have opted for tweaking the Pickering/Connick test in a 
different way that would have accomplished the majority’s goal of weeding out 
claims not worthy of judicial resources168 while retaining protection for the most 
valuable speech.169 
[T]he extent of the government’s legitimate 
authority over subjects of speech required by a 
public job can be recognized in advance by 
setting in effect a minimum heft for comments 
with any claim to outweigh it. Thus, the risks to 
the government are great enough for us to hold 
from the outset that an employee commenting on 
subjects in the course of duties should not 
 
166 A curious choice—Connick was a 5-4 decision and Givhan a unanimous one. 
167 Id. 
168 This concern is evident in the questioning at oral argument. For example, Chief Justice Roberts 
at one point asked, “[A]ren’t these cases going to cause terrible litigation problems?” and at another 
point noted, “Well, that was my point earlier. They can’t make short shrift of those cases, because 
they’re not going to be thrown out at the pleading stage. They’re going to have to progress at least 
to summary judgment . . . .” Tr. of Oral Argument at 45 and 50, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 
1951 (2006), March 21, 2006. 
169 It is arguable that Ceballos would not prevail under Justice Souter’s approach. Though Justice 
Souter would allow “comment on official dishonesty” to “weigh out in an employee’s favor,” there 
is no reason to believe it must weigh out in an employee’s favor. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1967 
(Souter, J., dissenting). 
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prevail on balance unless he speaks on a matter 
of unusual importance and satisfies high 
standards of responsibility in the way he does it. 
. . . [I]t is fair to say that only comment on 
official dishonest, deliberately unconstitutional 
action, other serious wrongdoing, or threats to 
health and safety can weigh out in an 
employee’s favor.170
This approach avoids creating perverse incentives to take complaints public 
before giving supervisors a chance to rectify problems. It raises the bar for First 
Amendment retaliation claims rather than shutting the door on them. 
The wisdom of the Souter approach is illustrated by a claim such as Keith 
Batt’s. Batt is the Oakland Police Department rookie who observed ruthless and 
pervasive criminal behavior, including the beating of citizens, by his fellow 
police officers—even by his supervisor.171 It is absurd for a claim regarding a 
matter of such high public import to have to step over an obstacle as arbitrary as 
the one created in Garcetti172 to reach the Pickering test. As Ceballos’s counsel 
said at oral argument in response to a suggestion that employers “would not be 
hostile” to receiving information about misconduct: “Unfortunately, there’s too 
much evidence, there’s too much water under the bridge that shows that public 
employees who deliver bad news, and are the unwelcome messenger, do face 
retaliation in their workplaces.”173 
CONCLUSION 
At first blush, Garcetti looked like it had the potential to eviscerate First 
Amendment protections for the speech of public employees,174 but the bigger 
picture indicates that the per se ruling is neither as airtight as its fans hope nor as 
devastating as its foes fear. There is a subset of employees whose claims can now 
 
170 Id. 
171 Batt v. City of Oakland, No. C 02-04975 MHP, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 47889 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 
2006). 
172 As Justice Souter put it, in reference to the “scope of responsibilities” test, “This is an odd place 
to draw a distinction [for First Amendment protection] . . . .” Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1965 (Souter, J., 
dissenting).  
173 Tr. of Oral Argument at 60, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006), March 21, 2006. 
174 Bonnie Robin-Vergeer, the Public Citizen Litigation Group attorney who argued on behalf of 
Ceballos, was quoted as saying that the chances of winning a First Amendment retaliation case 
after Garcetti are “almost none.” Melissa Harris, Top Court’s Actions Affect Rights of Employees, 
BALT. SUN, June 9, 2006, at 1G. 
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be more easily dismissed by a court that wishes to do so—and the decision may 
well furnish convenient grounds for courts to toss cases from employees even 
outside that subset. If the first published post-Garcetti cases are any indication, 
however, courts are finding it possible to read Garcetti in ways that allow 
plaintiffs with First Amendment claims to survive summary judgment even when 
the speech they assert is protected was job-related. Garcetti may ultimately have 
affected far fewer claims than has been hoped or feared.  
Nevertheless, there is reason to be concerned that Garcetti has cut off 
avenues for internal and external disclosure of government misconduct by 
eliminating First Amendment protection. There is also reason for concern that 
neither existing law nor the option of complaining publicly is an adequate 
substitute for constitutional protection. The loss of protection of valuable speech 
is not even likely to be offset by expedited disposition of cases or a 
corresponding drop in case filings because the threshold question requires 
determining what constitutes an employee’s “official duties” and is itself subject 
to litigation, as post-Garcetti cases illustrate. 
A better adjustment of Pickering and Connick would be one that, as Justice 
Souter recommends, raises the bar for employee claims but leaves the door open 
for constitutional protection of particularly valuable kinds of speech alerting the 
public to government wrongdoing.  
That yet another major First Amendment case has been decided by a single 
vote lends credence to Professor Rodric Schoen’s observation that “reasonable 
minds will differ on the ‘proper’ resolution of these cases.”175 Years before the 
Court revisited the issue, Schoen wrote, “[G]iven the sharp divisions in Connick 
and Rankin [both 5-4 decisions], perhaps the Justices . . . have decided that there 
is nothing more to be said on public employee free speech cases,” and added 
somewhat presciently, “or at least nothing to be added that would simplify 
resolution of these cases in the lower courts.”176 
175 Rodric Schoen, Pickering Plus Thirty Years: Public Employees and Free Speech, 30 TEX. TECH.
L. REV. 5, 51 (1999). 
176 Id. 
